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The Pillar 2 Undertaxed Payments Rule Departs From
International Consensus and Tax Treaties
by Jinyan Li
Jinyan Li is a
professor of law and codirector of the LLM tax
program at Osgoode
Hall Law School of
York University in
Canada. She is indebted
to Hugh J. Ault, Brian
Arnold, Reuven S. AviYonah, Richard Collier,
Wei Cui, Allan
Lanthier, Angelo
Nikolakakis, and H.
David Rosenbloom for
comments on an earlier version of this article.
She also thanks the members of an informal
pillar 2 study group — Catherine Brown, Wei
Cui, David Duff, Ken Klassen, Amin Mawani,
Jack Mintz, Jean-Pierre Vidal, and J. Scott
Wilkie — for helpful discussion. The views
expressed here are the author’s alone.
In this article, Li argues that the OECD’s
model undertaxed payments rule is in effect an
undertaxed profits rule and thus departs from
the global consensus reached in October 2021
and is incompatible with existing tax treaties.
The OECD released pillar 2 model rules1 last
December to provide a template for domestic
legislation to implement the agreement reached
on October 8, 2021, by almost 140 inclusive
framework members on a two-pillar solution to
address global tax challenges. The model rules are
limited to the income inclusion rule (IIR) and

1

Similar rules were included in the European Commission’s proposal
for a council directive to ensure a global minimum level of taxation for
multinational groups in the EU (COM(2021) 823 final), as well as in the
pillar 2 consultation paper released in January by HM Revenue &
Customs; U.K. HMRC, “OECD Pillar 2: Consultation on
Implementation” (Jan. 2022) (hereinafter “U.K. consultation paper”).

undertaxed payments rule (UTPR) (collectively
known as the global anti-base-erosion (GLOBE)
regime) in the October agreement. However, and
rather surprisingly, the meaning of the letter “P”
in the UTPR was effectively changed from
2
payments to profits in the model rules. There was
little, if any, public discussion about this variation.
The acronym UTPR is not truly defined in the
model rules; chapter 10 merely defines it to mean
“the rules set out in Article 2.4 to Article 2.6,” and
those rules do not refer to payments or profits. The
model rules do not even fully spell out UTPR and
use the acronym from the very beginning.
HM Revenue & Customs is more transparent
in its pillar 2 consultation paper by defining its
UTPR as an undertaxed profits rule. There is no
reason to think that the U.K. wording is not a
truthful translation of the meaning of the UTPR in
the model rules because the United Kingdom
genuinely supported pillar 2 by playing a key role
in forging consensus among G-7 countries in July
2021. HMRC sought comments on the translation
of model rules into U.K. domestic law as opposed
to the policy rationale of the rules or main design
features of the UTPR.3
What does the variation from undertaxed
payments rule to undertaxed profits rule mean?
Does it spell problems for pillar 2?

2

Also surprisingly, the model rules allow countries to introduce a
qualified domestic minimum top-up tax (QDMTT) based on the GLOBE
mechanics and reduce the amount of top-up tax that is due to be
collected under the IIR or UTPR by the amount of QDMTT (see article
5.2.3). The QDMTT is another innovation because it is not mentioned in
the October agreement. Some commentators argue that “the addition of
QDMTT effectively alters the rule order of Pillar 2. It moves ‘source’
countries to the head of the queue to collect the top-up tax generated by
Pillar 2.” See Michael P. Devereux, John Vella, and Heydon WardellBurrus, “Pillar 2: Rule Order, Incentives, and Tax Competition,” Policy
Brief, at 3 (Jan. 14, 2022).
3

U.K. consultation paper, supra note 1, at 1.24 and 1.25.
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This article argues that the variation changes
the nature of UTPR from the original anti-baseerosion (or tax-base-protection) rule to a tax-basesharing (or anti-tax-competition) rule. It delinks
the rule from any intragroup base-eroding
payments so that the erosion of the tax base of the
UTPR jurisdiction is no longer a precondition for
the imposition of the top-up tax. It is true that the
modified UTPR can reduce the incentive to shift
profits to low- or no-tax jurisdictions by creating a
floor on tax competition among jurisdictions.
However, by not requiring the low-taxed profits
to have any nexus with the taxing jurisdiction, the
model rule effectively creates a new basis for tax
jurisdiction. Thus, it arguably departs from the
consensus in the October agreement, the existing
international tax consensus based on the
4
economic allegiance theory and value creation
principle and contradicts existing tax treaty
provisions. Adopting the model UTPR may be
inconsistent with a country’s obligation to
implement its bilateral tax treaties in good faith as
required by the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties. Those legal problems will likely add
more uncertainty in implementing pillar 2.
I. The Different ‘P’ in the Model UTPR
5

The UTPR is intended to backstop the IIR. If
there is any top-up tax of an in-scope corporate
group, arising in any jurisdiction, the group’s
ultimate or intermediary parent can charge the
top-up tax. If the IIR is not charged on the full
amount of the top-up tax, a jurisdiction where a
constituent entity is located can charge a top-up
tax under the UTPR through denying deductions
in computing corporate income tax or by way of
an equivalent adjustment. Together, the IIR and
UTPR ensure the global profit of an in-scope
corporate group is taxed at the minimum 15
percent effective tax rate (ETR). The computation
is largely based on financial accounting values as

opposed to tax laws. The amount of top-up tax is
determined jurisdiction by jurisdiction.
Effectively replacing the word “payments”
with “profits” in the model UTPR may appear
harmless, but in income tax law, those words
represent very different concepts. In international
taxation, the replacement is tantamount to
creating a new basis for a country to tax profit that
is not earned by its resident company or sourced
in its jurisdiction. This new basis is based on
having a constituent entity located in its
jurisdiction and the corporate group’s income not
being taxed by another country up to the
minimum tax rate. Even though each constituent
entity may be presumed to contribute to the
creation of group residual profit, including
synergetic benefit, existing domestic laws or tax
treaties do not recognize the right to tax that profit
in the absence of specific intragroup transactions.
Therefore, the change is revolutionary as it can
permit a country to tax income that has no
connection to it.
A. The Agreement’s Payments-Based Rule
In the October agreement, UTPR refers to
undertaxed payments rule. The original UTPR
was modeled on the U.S. base erosion and
antiabuse tax. Even though the BEAT is not
exactly a tax on base-eroding payments per se, its
application is tied to base-eroding payments by a
U.S. resident corporation to foreign related
persons. As an alternative minimum tax, the
BEAT is intended to protect the U.S. tax base that
is otherwise eroded by related-party payments
and not caught by subpart F. In other words, the
6
source of the undertaxed income can be
presumed to be in the United States, so the United
States is not a “stranger” to the income.
Until the publication of the model rules, the
OECD used the word “payments” in various
phrases in discussing the UTPR. For example:
• The 2019 work program describes the
GLOBE proposal as an IIR and a base-

4

G.W.J. Bruins et al., “Report on Double Taxation Submitted to the
Financial Committee — Economic and Financial Commission Report by
the Experts on Double Taxation,” E.F.S.73.F.19 (Apr. 5, 1923).
5

The UTPR can be viewed as a supplement to the IIR or an
enforcement mechanism. It applies only if there is a top-up tax that is not
picked up through the IIR. For further discussion, see Brian Arnold,
“The Arnold Report: The Model Rules for the Pillar Two Global
Minimum Tax,” Canadian Tax Foundation (Feb. 1, 2022).
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6

The notion of “source” is critical in international taxation, but its
meaning is uncertain. See Hugh J. Ault and David F. Bradford, “Taxing
International Income: An Analysis of the U.S. System and Its Economic
Premises,” in Taxation in the Global Economy 11 (1990); Jinyan Li and J.
Scott Wilkie, “Elegance in Territorial Simplicity: An Historical Review of
the Canadian Notion of Source,” in Income Tax at 100 Years: Essays and
Reflections on the Income War Tax Act 11:1-53 (2017).
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eroding tax payments rule that “would
operate by way of a denial of a deduction or
imposition of source-based taxation . . . for
certain payments unless that payment was
subject to tax at or above a minimum rate.”
• The January 2020 statement says the UTPR
operates “by denying a deduction or
making an equivalent adjustment in respect
of intra-group payments.”
• According to the 2020 pillar 2 blueprint, the
rule requires a UTPR taxpayer that is a
member of a multinational enterprise to
make an adjustment for any top-up tax
allocated to it from a low-tax constituent
entity in the same group. The top-up tax is
allocated to a UTPR taxpayer in two steps.
First, if the UTPR taxpayer makes any
deductible payments to the low-tax
constituent entity during the relevant
period, that entity’s top-up tax is allocated to
the taxpayer in proportion to the total
deductible payments made to that entity by
all UTPR taxpayers. Second, if the UTPR
taxpayer has net intragroup expenditures,
the remaining top-up tax is allocated in
proportion to the total amount of those
expenditures incurred by all UTPR
taxpayers.
A reasonable interpretation of the above
history is that the UTPR applies only when there
are intragroup payments by a constituent entity to
a low-taxed entity. The underlying rationale for
the UTPR country to tax the paying entity is that
the low-taxed profit is shifted from or originated
in its jurisdiction. That is similar to the rationale of
the BEAT. There seemed to be no suggestions that
the original UTPR would be triggered in the
absence of any intragroup base-eroding
payments. It is reasonable to presume that the
meaning of the term “undertaxed payments rule”
in the agreement was based on the earlier OECD
articulation of the UTPR in terms of the basic
nature and design.
B. The Model’s Profits-Based Rule
The model UTPR does not explicitly refer to
“undertaxed payments.” It does not require a
UTPR taxpayer to have any intragroup baseeroding payments to low-taxed entities. The word
“payments” is not used in specifying a condition

for charging a UTPR tax, but in describing a
method of collecting the tax.7
According to model article 2.4.1, constituent
entities of an MNE located in the implementing
jurisdiction will be denied a corporate tax
deduction on payments made by constituent
entities (or required to make an equivalent
adjustment under domestic law) in an amount
resulting in their having an additional cash tax
expense equal to the UTPR top-up tax for the
fiscal year allocated to that jurisdiction. There are
no requirements that the payments subject to the
deduction limitations are made to any constituent
entities of the corporate group. Thus, payments to
high-taxed constituent entities or third parties can
be subject to the limitation or, in effect,
disregarded in computing ordinary corporate
income tax.
The undertaxed profit does not have to arise
in or have any nexus with the UTPR jurisdiction.
Any constituent entity of an in-scope
multinational group is a UTPR taxpayer if it has
employees and tangible assets. Subject to articles
2.6.2 and 2.6.3, article 2.6.1 says the top-up tax
allocated to the implementing jurisdiction is
determined by multiplying the total UTPR top-up
tax by the jurisdiction’s UTPR percentage. That
percentage is determined each fiscal year for each
MNE using the following formula:

The U.K. consultation paper, which aims to
translate the above rules into U.K. law, says that
the above rules do not prescribe how the top-up
tax is brought into charge and offers two possible
approaches:

7

Article 2.5.1 defines the total UTPR top-up tax for a fiscal year as the
sum of the top-up tax for each low-taxed constituent entity of an MNE
for that fiscal year.
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• One is to deny a deduction on payments
made by constituent entities in the United
Kingdom. The top-up tax would be
converted into payments by dividing the tax
by the U.K. statutory corporate tax rate. This
would cap the charge to the lower of the topup tax allocated to the United Kingdom and
the amount of payments made by U.K.
constituent entities. “So, the denial [of
deduction] could apply to any payment
made from an entity, not just in respect of
related party payments to the relevant lowtaxed jurisdiction,” and “there does not
need to be any link between the type of
expense which is denied and the nature of
8
the low-taxed income.”
• The second approach is not in the model
rules but can be designed to meet the
equivalent adjustment requirements in the
model rules: a new charge on a U.K.
constituent entity based on the top-up tax
allocated to the United Kingdom that is
capped by reference to the payments made
by constituent entities.
There may be circumstances in which there
are insufficient payments in the UTPR jurisdiction
to charge the top-up tax. The model rules require
the uncollected portion of the top-up tax to be
carried forward and collected in the next year. If
there are insufficient deductions to collect the tax,
there will be a further adjustment in the second
year to collect the remaining top-up tax. The
model rules also prevent future top-up tax from
being allocated to a UTPR jurisdiction that has
carried forward some of its top-up tax from an
earlier year. In that case, the allocation key for that
jurisdiction would be zero, according to articles
2.6.3 and 2.6.4 of the model rules. The UTPR tax
base would be allocated to other jurisdictions
where constituent entities have sufficient profits.

is no need for the taxpayer’s profit (or the UTPR
jurisdiction’s tax base) to be reduced by any
outgoing payments to a low-tax constituent entity
of the group. The UTPR jurisdiction can gain a tax
base by grabbing the tax that is not charged by the
country where the low-tax entity is located and
9
profit is generated. The operation of the model
UTPR is illustrated in the following hypothetical
case study.
Multinational XYZ is within the scope of pillar
10
2. Its ultimate parent, USParent, is in the United
States. It has four wholly owned subsidiaries:
UKSub in the United Kingdom, FrenchSub in
France, CanSub in Canada, and ChinaSub in
China.
We assume that the global intangible lowtaxed income regime is not a qualified IIR. China
does not implement pillar 2.11 The United
Kingdom, France, and Canada adopt the model
UTPR.
Both China and the United States have tax
incentives for research and development that
reduce the ETR for USParent and ChinaSub to
below 15 percent. ChinaSub’s ETR is 6 percent on
its adjusted GLOBE income of 100, and USParent’s
ETR is 12 percent on its adjusted GLOBE income
of 100. The top-up tax is 9 for ChinaSub and 3 for
USParent. Neither USParent nor ChinaSub
receives any tax-deductible payments from any of
UKSub, FrenchSub, or CanSub.
We also assume that the number of employees
and total value of tangible assets in CanSub,
FrenchSub, and UKSub are the same. The UTPR
tax liability for each of UKSub, FrenchSub, and
CanSub is thus 3 (in regard to ChinaSub) plus 1 (in
regard to USParent) — that is, 1/3 of the total topup tax in each jurisdiction. In effect, the 9 Chinese
tax and 3 U.S. tax are picked up by the United
Kingdom, France, and Canada. This top-up tax
could be collected through denying deductions in

C. Transformative Change: An Illustration
The effective change of the meaning of the
letter “P” in the model rules is not just semantics.
It has the effect of transforming the UTPR from an
anti-base-erosion rule to a tax-base-sharing or
anti-tax-competition rule. To trigger the tax, there

9

The UTPR is a supplement for the minimum tax, but there are no
rules prohibiting a country from imposing a UTPR tax as long as there is
a top-up tax that is not picked up by an IIR in another jurisdiction.
10

For definitions of the terms “ultimate parent entity,” “intermediary
parent entity,” “ETR,” and “GLOBE income,” see chapter 10 of the
model rules.
11

8

U.K. consultation paper, supra note 1, at sections 7.52-7.53.
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If every country adopts pillar 2 or even introduces a QDMTT, none
of the problems discussed in this article would arise. It is beyond the
scope of this article to examine the chance of that happening.
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computing corporate tax on payments made by
UKSub, FrenchSub, and CanSub to anyone.
If the top-up tax charged to CanSub cannot be
collected because of insufficient payments,
CanSub’s future percentage would be zero, and
Canada would no longer be able to share the topup tax.
In contrast, because there are no base-eroding
payments from UKSub, FrenchSub, or CanSub to
ChinaSub or USParent, the UTPR was not
triggered under the agreement. In addition to
neutralizing the effect of tax incentives in China
and the United States, the model UTPR can
effectively shift the Chinese and U.S. tax bases to
the United Kingdom, France, and Canada.
II. Model UTPR Deviates From Consensus
Given the absence of any explicit
authorization in the October agreement to replace
payments with profits, the model UTPR may be
viewed as going beyond the international
consensus. The model rules are expected to give
effect to, not replace, the GLOBE rules. The annex
to the October agreement says the “model rules
will define the scope and set out the mechanics of
the GLOBE rules” and “include the rules for
determining the ETR on a jurisdictional basis and
the relevant exclusions, such as the formulaic
substance-based carve-out” and “cover
administrative provisions.” Nowhere does the
October agreement refer to introducing a
fundamental change through model rules. It can
be argued, though, that the modified UTPR is
consistent with the overall purpose of the GLOBE
rules — all income of in-scope corporate groups is
taxed at the 15 percent ETR.
The model UTPR is a fundamental departure
from the economic allegiance doctrine that is the
bedrock of the century-old international tax
consensus. According to the economic allegiance
doctrine, a country’s competence in taxing a

person’s income depends on the person’s
economic allegiance with that country.12 In other
words, when it comes to distributing taxing
rights, the correct question is: “In what ways and
to what extent can a man be served by two or
more governments that he should owe them any
duty?” A country of production, possession, and
disposition of wealth renders services to a
taxpayer by ensuring stable government, laws,
and a “proper environment.” The outcome of
applying the model UTPR in the case study would
be inconsistent with the economic allegiance
doctrine as the United Kingdom, France, and
Canada could collect taxes on the Chinese or U.S.
13
income without any role in its generation.
The model UTPR also departs from the
guiding principle in the original base erosion and
profit-shifting project: Profits should be taxed in
the jurisdiction where they are derived. That
value creation principle is most relevant in the
actions 8-10 report on transfer pricing, which was
incorporated into the OECD transfer pricing
guidelines. Value creation can be evidenced by
production and other economic activities;
ownership of financial capital and intangible
property; and the development, enhancement,
maintenance, protection, and exploitation of
intangibles. By allocating the top-up tax
according to a formula that is not connected to the
generation of the undertaxed profits, the model
UTPR ignores the value creation principle and is
indifferent toward the alignment of the location of
14
taxation with the location of value creation.

12

Id. The economic allegiance doctrine reflects the benefit principle.
The idea behind the benefit principle is that fiscal jurisdictions charge a
price proportionate to the public services rendered to the taxpayer. Even
though it is impossible to attribute a specific value of public services
rendered to a taxpayer, this principle is helpful to explaining the
importance of linking a country’s tax jurisdiction and the activities of a
taxpayer in that jurisdiction. For further discussion, see Wolfgang Schön,
“Value Creation, the Benefit Principle and Efficiency-Related Allocation
of Taxing Rights,” Working Paper of the Max Planck Institute for Tax
Law and Public Finance No. 2021-06 (2021).
13

It is unclear if this outcome was intended by inclusive framework
members who joined the October agreement. For example, the EU draft
directive, supra note 1, at 1, explains that the GLOBE rules were designed
“to ensure that all corporations pay their fair share of tax on profits
generated by their activities in the EU.” If France adopts the model
UTPR, it would be taxing profits generated by activities outside the EU.
14

See Angelo Nikolakakis, “Aligning the Location of Taxation With
the Location of Value Creation: Are We There Yet!?!” 75(11/12) Bull. Int’l
Tax’n 549 (Nov./Dec. 2021) (arguing that the dislocation between location
of taxation and location of value creation applies equally under the
original version of UTPR, which was the version analyzed in this article).
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III. Incompatibility With Tax Treaties
A. OECD View Is Problematic
The OECD pillar 2 blueprint states that the IIR
and UTPR are compatible with tax treaties:
10.4.1 General principles.
679. The common starting point for an
analysis of the compatibility of the IIR and
UTPR with existing tax treaty obligations
is the general principle that, with limited
exceptions, tax treaties are not intended to
restrict a jurisdiction’s right to tax its own
residents. This longstanding principle is
now codified in Article 1(3) of the OECD
model (often referred to as the “saving
clause”), and reads as follows:
This Convention shall not affect the
taxation, by a Contracting State, of its
residents except with respect to the
benefits granted under paragraph 3 of
Article 7, paragraph 2 of Article 9 and
Articles 19, 20, 23 [A] [B], 24, 25 and 28.
680. As a general matter, then, tax treaties
should not present any obstacle to
jurisdictions implementing an IIR and
UTPR along the lines envisaged under the
GloBE.
10.4.3. Undertaxed payments rule (UTPR).
684. The UTPR serves as a backstop to the
IIR. It operates when the IIR does not
apply by providing jurisdictions with a
tool to protect themselves from the effect
of base eroding transactions. In order to
do so, the UTPR takes the form of a
limitation (or denial) of the deduction of
intra-group payments, or an equivalent
adjustment. The extent to which the
deduction of an intra-group payment is
affected by the UTPR depends on the
amount of top-up tax that is allocated to a
UTPR Taxpayer. As described in Chapter
7, the UTPR uses the same mechanics as
the IIR for determining the MNE’s
jurisdictional ETR and the amount of topup tax allocable under the rule. The UTPR,
however, operates through an allocation

1700

key that is based on deductible intragroup payments.
The above view on the UTPR’s compatibility
does not apply to the model UTPR because the
model rule removes the link to intragroup
payments and is no longer an anti-base-erosion
rule. It is, in effect, a kind of modified formulary
apportionment. As mentioned earlier, the UTPR
does not require the income to have any
connection with the erosion of the UTPRimplementing jurisdiction’s tax base.
More generally, the saving clause in article
1(3) of the 2017 OECD model convention may not
be in all tax treaties of a UTPR jurisdiction. Even if
it were, the saving clause arguably does not cover
the profits-based UTPR for three main reasons:
• What is being taxed is not its resident’s
income, but a nonresident’s. As the case
study shows, the United Kingdom, France,
or Canada would be taxing Chinese or U.S.
income earned by ChinaSub or USParent
who is a nonresident in the United
Kingdom, France, or Canada under existing
domestic law and tax treaties.
• The model UTPR is no longer an antiabuse
rule by delinking with any intragroup baseerosion payments. The intention of the
saving clause is to allow a country to
prevent tax avoidance through domestic
antiabuse rules such as a controlled foreign
corporation, interest deduction limitation
15
under BEPS action 4, or even BEAT. As
shown in the case study, the tax base (as
defined under existing laws) of the United
Kingdom, France, or Canada is not eroded.
• The saving clause does not apply to anti-taxcompetition rules, such as the model UTPR.
One can even say that the object and

15

For commentary on the saving clause, see OECD, “Commentaries
on the Articles of the Model Tax Convention” (2017). For discussion of
whether the BEAT constitutes a treaty override, see H. David
Rosenbloom and Fadi Shaheen, “The BEAT and the Treaties,” Tax Notes
Int’l, Oct. 1, 2018, p. 53; and Reuven S. Avi-Yonah and Bret Wells, “The
BEAT and Treaty Overrides: A Brief Response to Rosenbloom and
Shaheen,” Tax Notes Int’l, Oct. 22, 2018, p. 383.
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purpose of existing tax treaties do not
include preventing tax competition.16
B. Extraterritorial Taxation of Profit
By delinking the UTPR from intragroup baseeroding payments, the model UTPR effectively
becomes a pure tax-base-sharing or
extraterritorial taxation rule. It is true that the
original UTPR has an element of tax-base sharing
by allowing the paying jurisdiction to, in effect,
tax payments (such as interest or royalties) that
are reasonable and otherwise deductible under its
normal rules while the receiving jurisdiction has
the ultimate right to tax income arising from the
interest or royalty payments. The modified UTPR
would allow any UTPR jurisdiction to tax the
income of any other jurisdiction. This is a
qualitative shift in terms of distributing taxing
rights among countries. This type of
extraterritorial taxation of business profit is
difficult to justify under existing tax treaties,
especially article 7 and article 9, which are based
on the OECD model convention.
Article 7 distributes taxing rights between the
contracting states based on a corporation’s
residence and the source of profits — that is,
profits attributable to a permanent establishment
in the other contracting state. The profit of a
resident in one contracting state is taxable only in
that state in the absence of a PE in the other
contracting state. Having a sister corporation in
the other state alone does not bring its profits
within the taxing jurisdiction of the other state. In
the case study, article 7 in the relevant applicable
tax treaties does not authorize the United
Kingdom, France, or Canada to tax business
profits of ChinaSub or USParent.
Article 9 reflects the arm’s-length principle
and allows the contracting states to adjust the
profits of associated enterprises arising from
transfer pricing transactions. It applies only to
transactions between an enterprise in a
contracting state and another enterprise in the
other contracting state. It is not applicable in the

absence of any transactions. The OECD transfer
pricing guidelines have consistently stated that
formulary apportionment is inconsistent with the
arm’s-length principle. That is likely the reason
pillar 1 requires a multilateral tax convention to
override existing tax treaties. The two-factor
formula in the model UTPR rules (number of
employees and value of tangible assets) is thus
inconsistent with article 9 in applicable tax
treaties. This formula is a worse offender of the
arm’s-length principle than the formula in pillar 1
because the number of employees (as opposed to
the payroll value) is arguably less correlated to
value creation.
Because the UTPR jurisdiction is not taxing its
resident’s foreign income but the income of a
treaty country’s resident, the saving clause in
article 1(3) cannot save the UTPR tax.
C. Tax Discrimination
Article 24(5) forbids a contracting state from
giving less favorable treatment to an enterprise
whose capital is owned or controlled (wholly or
partly, directly or indirectly) by at least one
resident of the other contracting state. The model
UTPR applies only to entities owned by foreign17
based parent companies.
In the case study, UKSub, FrenchSub, and
CanSub were wholly owned by USParent. The
imposition of the UTPR tax is arguably forbidden
by the U.K.-U.S. tax treaty, France-U.S. tax treaty,
and Canada-U.S. tax treaty.
D. Double Taxation
Tax treaties are intended to prevent double
taxation of income through distribution of taxing
rights and requirement of the residence country to
provide relief from double taxation (article 23a or
23b of the OECD model convention). Double
taxation of income could arise under the model
UTPR. For example, in the case study, the Chinese
income of 100 is taxed in China, then in the United
Kingdom/France/Canada under the UTPR, and
possibly in the United States under GILTI.

16

For further discussion, see Vikram Chand, Alessandro Turina, and
Kinga Romanovska, “Tax Treaty Obstacles in Implementing the Pillar
Two Global Minimum Tax Rules and a Possible Solution for Eliminating
the Various Challenges,” 14(1) World Tax J. 1-31 (2022); and Maarten de
Wilde, “Why Pillar Two Top-Up Taxation Requires Tax Treaty
Modification,” Kluwer International Tax Blog, Jan. 12, 2022.
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Because the UTPR tax is unlikely creditable
against GILTI tax,18 there would be double
taxation of the undertaxed Chinese income and
no relief mechanism seems to exist.
IV. General Legal Challenges
A. Pacta Sunt Servanda
Given the model UTPR’s nature as an anti-taxcompetition or tax-base-sharing rule (as opposed
to an antiabuse rule) and its incompatibility with
existing tax treaties, it is questionable whether a
country that implements it can be viewed as
acting in good faith under article 26 of the Vienna
Convention.
Under the principle of pacta sunt servanda,
parties to a treaty must keep their sides of the
bargain and perform their obligations in good
faith. Domestic tax laws, even those based on
global model rules, should not have the effect of
redefining the scope of taxing rights in a way that
is clearly contradictory to the treaty.
In the case study, the UTPR tax in the United
Kingdom, France, and Canada is arguably not
permitted by the applicable tax treaty. Therefore,
it is difficult to maintain that these countries act in
good faith in implementing their tax treaties if
they change their domestic law to levy the UTPR
tax.
B. Existing National Laws
The model UTPR must be translated into
domestic law. The domesticated UTPR should
operate both in parallel with and in conjunction
with existing corporate tax rules. Even though the
computation of the UTPR tax is based on
consolidated accounting income (with some
adjustments) and a formula for allocating the topup tax to each jurisdiction, the collection of the tax
requires identifying constituent entities whose
deductions will be denied. Because the UTPR
applies after the application of existing antiabuse
rules, such as thin capitalization and interest
expense limitation rules, it is inevitable to
integrate the UTPR and existing rules. The U.K.
consultation paper notes that the government
18

anticipates possible challenges in identifying
entities with the most profit capacity to absorb the
top up and creating ordering rules when there are
different tax rates on some types of income,
deductions are already subject to limitation under
19
other tax rules, or the group has losses.
National corporate tax rules are not
harmonized. For example, some countries allow
consolidated taxation of corporate groups (for
example, the United Kingdom and the United
States in the case study) and others do not (for
example, Canada and China in the case study).
There may be further challenges in implementing
UTPR in the latter type of countries as they need
to integrate group taxation with the existing
entity-by-entity system of taxation. These
challenges may be more serious in federalist
jurisdictions (for example, Canada) where subnational level corporate tax issues are involved.
It would also be interesting to see how the
UTPR is given effect in existing income tax
legislation that typically contains charging rules
based on residence of a taxpayer or domestic
source of income. For example, section 2 of the
Canadian Income Tax Act stipulates that an
income tax shall be paid on the taxable income of
every person resident in Canada or a nonresident
person but only to the extent that the nonresident
person carried on business in Canada or disposed
of a taxable Canadian property. The UTPR tax is
payable by a resident corporation on income that
is not owned by it or is imputed to it. Unlike the
existing CFC rule, there is no imputation of
foreign low-taxed profit under the UTPR. So the
Canadian Parliament needs to give itself the
power to tax income that is earned by a foreign
person in a foreign country. There seems to be no
precedent for claiming that kind of taxing power
in Canada.
C. Treaty Overrides
Adopting the model UTPR into domestic law
arguably gives rise to a treaty override. In some
countries, a treaty override may be lawful because
treaties are equal to domestic law, and the
20
principle of lex posterior or parliamentary

For further discussion of the U.S. foreign tax rules in the context of
GILTI, see Mindy Herzfeld, “The Problematic New FTC Regs,” Tax Notes
Federal, Feb. 28, 2022, p. 1195.
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supremacy prevails. In Canada, some provisions
of the Income Tax Conventions Interpretation Act
may be considered to constitute treaty overrides
but are mostly in the nature of ambulatory
interpretation or antiabuse under the saving
clause.
In other countries (for example, France and
China), it might be impossible for a state to
override a treaty if the constitution places treaties
on a higher pedestal than domestic law.21 EU
members might overcome that hurdle by
adopting the model UTPR into EU law, which
prevails over all law, including tax treaties.22 In
other countries, a constitutional amendment may
23
be required.
D. Country-by-Country Judicial Interpretation
Corporations that are charged a top-up tax
under the domesticated UTPR may challenge the
tax in courts. Judges might find the rule to be
overruled by an applicable tax treaty. Tax
planning arrangements to minimize the top-up
tax might be found acceptable, given the
24
uncertainty in the legislation.
Nothing in the model rules or October
agreement can make judges of participating
countries adopt a common approach to
interpretation and adjudication. In Canada, for
example, the OECD model convention, OECD
commentaries on the convention or OECD
transfer pricing guidelines do not have the force
of law, even though they may be considered by
courts to have some persuasive value in
25
interpretation. The same approach is expected to
apply to the model rules and OECD
commentaries on the model rules. As a result, the
global rules on paper could turn out differently in
legal reality.

V. Implications for the Fate of Pillar 2
Effectively replacing the term “payments”
with “profits” in the model UTPR could have
serious implications for the fate of pillar 2. It
renders the OECD’s view on treaty compatibility
less persuasive — or even incorrect — by
removing the link to intragroup base-eroding
payments. It arguably changes the nature of the
rule from an anti-base-erosion rule to a tax-basesharing rule that is outside the saving clause.
Countries that adopt the model UTPR could face
significant legal uncertainties. Those problems are
difficult to address without a multilateral tax
convention.26
Thus, changing the meaning of “P” in the
model rules might spell legal problems for pillar
2.


21

Chand, Turina, and Romanovska, supra note 16.

22

Id.

23

KPMG US LLP, “Switzerland: Implementation of Pillar Two Global
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In Canada, a taxpayer’s right to arrange its affairs to save tax is a
bedrock of the system. The Supreme Court of Canada recently reiterated
that in Canada v. Alta Energy Luxembourg SARL, 2021 SCC 49, aff’g 2020
FCA 43, aff’g 2018 TCC 152. For analysis, see Li, “Finding the Purpose of
Tax Treaty Provisions Under GAAR: Lessons From Alta Energy,” Tax
Notes Int’l, Jan. 10, 2022, p. 147.
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See Li, Arthur Cockfield, and Wilkie, International Taxation in Canada
50-58, 128-131 (2018).
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See Mary C. Bennett, “Contemplating a Multilateral Convention to
Implement OECD Pillars 1 and 2,” Tax Notes Federal, June 14, 2021, p.
1729.
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